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Rural survival in Africa, as elsewhere, depends
predominantly upon social rather than ecological
factors once a division of labour between town and
country has been established. The viability of the
production process on the farm becomes a function of
the effectiveness of the external structures which
manage the interaction between them; more especially,
that of the agencies, public and private, which
guarantee property rights, supply inputs and market
outputs. While there is much evidence to suggest that
farmers, even the poorest and most ill-educated, will
maximise their output when conditions permit, it is
equally clear that production will decline when these
processes of mediation break down.
This article attempts to confront the problem of
agrarian failure as a problem of comparative
institutional analysis rather than one of farm level
organisation. To focus the argument it will concentrate
upon the current debate about the relative merits of
market-directed as opposed to state-directed forms of
activity, and will attempt to treat both as a problem of
public policy formation rather than economic
analysis. In other words, it must be read as an exercise
in political rather than economic theory.
Choosing Alternatives: Public vs Private
Provision
An important element in the orthodox critique of
African agriculture relates to the centrality of state
controls in the supply of inputs and organisation of
marketing. According to the Berg report:
The central problem in marketing and input
strategy is the very general tendency to give too
large a set of responsibilities to public sector
institutions, and too few to other agents -
individual traders, private companies and farmers'
cooperatives [World Bank 198 1:581
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The effect of these monopolies has been said to be
price distortions, excessive costs, inefficiency, low
prices to the grower and a decline in output resulting
from the corresponding lack of incentives. The
alternative it to make the system 'more competitive'
(p62), and in particular 'to capitalise on the existing
trading system, a proven asset, and let it play a bigger
role in the distribution system' (p64). The reasons for
the inefficiency of state sector monopolies is not
examined, while the power of competition as a means
of guaranteeing the anticipated efficiency of the
private sector producers is taken as a given. More
especially, the faith in competition makes it possible to
ignore entirely the organisational structure of the
private sector agencies which are expected to perform
these functions since, following the logic of
neoclassical theory, it is assumed that if market
competition is allowed to 'get the prices right' the
capitalist entrepreneurs can be relied on to solve their
own internal organisational problems. After all, only
those actually capable of maximising profits by
minimising costs will then be able to survive for long in
the rigorous conditions established in the marketplace.
Thus, although we see that the orthodox reform
proposals start with an assertion of the need for a
reform of both policy programmes and institutional
structures, they end up being entirely lacking in any
theory of either political intervention or administrative
structure.
Most neo-Marxist critics of the African failure, on the
other hand, do not share the orthodox enthusiasm for
the market, but they, too, tend to associate centralised
state control with the exploitation of the direct
producers. Here we find a picture of a parasitic
bureaucratic bourgeoisie appropriating surpluses for
its own benefit and that of the foreign private
bourgeoisie on which they depend for skills,
technology and political reinforcement [e.g. Shivji
1976; von Freyhold 1979]. In this approach the
functioning of institutional structures is the outcome
of the overriding influence of the all-powerful
international bourgeoisie, thus excluding an auto-
nomous role for domestic elements in the political
struggle, and eliminating any possibility of a
progressive reform of the existing system short of
some form of social revolution whose outcome they
cannot anticipate. Here again, therefore, the possibility
ofa rational theory of political intervention within the
existing structures of resource allocation is excluded.
I cannot attempt here to address all of the issues raised
in these two approaches, nor to consider the role of
external factors in the situation, whose significance is
undeniable. What I do wish to suggest is that neither of
them gives us any real understanding of the internal
factors contributing to the emergence of the offending
system, and that neither of them can therefore provide
much help in the search for solutions. The lack of any
adequate theory of political/institutional mediation in
both approaches then simply compounds this
problem. The neo-Marxist rejection of both market
and bureaucratic solutions in favour of an ill-defined
conception of democratic planning from below (in fact
a retreat into nationalistic anarchism), thus provides
no solution to the problem of restructuring the actual
institutions upon which the immediate survival of the
population depends. The orthodox model, on the
other hand, simply asserts the superiority of the
market solution on the basis of theoretical first
principles, and makes no equivalent analysis of the
conditions needed to reap the very real benefits which
can undoubtedly be created by the development of
efficient bureaucracies. After all, Weber's assertion
that bureaucracy is, from a purely technical point of
view, capable of attaining the highest degree of
efficiency and is 'the most rational known means of
carrying out imperative control over human beings',
has yet to be effectively disputed [Weber 1947:337].
To do this we must first consider the way in which
these state forms were created during the colonial
period, then the nature of the transformation which
they underwent as they were restructured by the new
African ruling class. In both phases our concern in the
first instance will be less with the economic rationality
of the decision-making process, than with the nature
of the class interests involved in the political struggle
for control over resources. At the end of the day, after
all, it is the political leverage exerted by those who
control institutions which keep those institutions
(however degenerate) in existence. Equally, the
possibility of real reform must depend upon the
capacity to mobilise real political support in the
opposite direction, and not simply upon the
production of rational economic models by the
consultancy industry.
On the other hand, the failure of powerful class forces
to generate effective solutions to social problems must
itself be seen as the result of an attempt to use
irrational and contradictory forms of social organi-
sation for the purpose, and equally, no attempt at
reform will succeed unless these failures can be
theoretically understood and rectified. Thus the
historical critique cannot be separated from the
theoretical categories developed in the intellectual
traditions which have formulated our models of
market and bureaucratic organisation, nor can any
treatment of possible alternatives.
From Market to Monopoly in the Colonial
Period
The initial expansion of African cash crop production
in the colonial era took place in a context in which
private market allocations predominated. The peasant
was forced to enter the market to pay taxes and secure
imported consumer goods; their products and
consumables were delivered by a hierarchy of private
traders dominated at the top by a small group of
European and Asian trading houses responsible for
processing and foreign purchases and sales, and at the
bottom by an array of intermediaries ranging from
individual produce buyers with bicycles to relatively
wealthy middlemen with access to lorries and storage
space. The state apparatus provided very limited
services directly to growers in the way of agricultural
research, advice and technology, but was mainly
important in relation to the maintenance of law and
order and creation of infrastructure.
This almost classic laissez faire context in fact
generated an extremely dynamic growth process in
favoured regions within reach of external markets.
Monopoly power on a voluntary basis was sometimes
significant among the foreign merchant houses, a
function of the concentration of capital in the large
British trading houses associated with the organisation
of cartels designed to limit competition for crops and
thus keep down prices to growers [cf. Howard 1978].
Yet high profits drew new producers into this sector
often from India and Lebanon, while the existence ofa
large and competitive petty trading sector maximised
the tendency towards competition among the larger
firms. The voluntary cartels organised by the
dominant European companies therefore tended to
collapse, threatening the high-cost firms with
bankruptcy.
At their behest, therefore, the colonial state intervened
more and more actively, particularly in the depression
years, to control competition and guarantee a cost
plus pricing system to even the least efficient
producers Brett 1973; Mamdani 1976]. During the
war this monopolistic structure was further reinforced
with the creation of state marketing boards with
monopoly buying power and the right to set prices for
both growers and intermediaries. During the 1940s
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this power was generally used to maintain very high
profits for the expatriate marketing sector and to
extract large surpluses for the state from the grower as
raw material prices rose. The monopoly power
allocated to the expatriate traders effectively destroyed
the bargaining power of the independent indigenous
buying agents, and the surplus extracted from the
growers through the monopoly rents of both traders
and state marketing boards meant that the direct
producers were provided with neither the incentive
nor the resources required to increase their output,
with very negative results.
In effect a reactionary foreign merchant class now
dominated the state, blocking the emergence of an
indigenous merchant class and maintaining the
peasant producer in a state of servile backwardness.
The state, in the marketing board mechanism, now
had additional means to extract surpluses from the
direct producer, thus further reinforcing the fact that
the most certain source of personal enrichment must
be the capture of state power and the monopoly rents
that went with it, rather than through the actual
expansion of the forces of production.
By the later colonial period, therefore, the dynamism
of the early laissez-faire period had been lost and a
structure created which not only inhibited economic
growth and social change, but also inevitably
engendered the hostility of the major groups in
colonial society. By so doing it simultaneously created
the nationalist coalition and the post-colonial
problems that this coalition was to find so difficult to
resolve.
The Nationalist Response: Nationalising the
Monopolies
The colonial monopolies described above excluded
the small African petit bourgeoisie from access to the
market and it imposed a structure of unequal
exchange upon the peasantry. Further, this monopoly
existed in the state apparatus as an exclusion of
Africans from the higher levels of the administrative
system and from the educational opportunities
required to obtain the skills required to compete for
them. As a result the intelligentsia, the commercial
petit bourgeoisie and the peasantry could all be united
in a common anti-colonial alliance, which could also
expect the support of the small working class whose
struggle over wages and conditions had brought them
into conflict with their largely expatriate employers.
For as long as colonialism continued, these disparate
elements could be held together by their common
opposition to one or other aspect of the racist power
structure. Once in power, however, anti-colonialism
had to be transformed from a negative critique into a
positive developmental strategy - crops had to be
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grown, processed and sold; services had to be provided
by the state; a new industrial sector created to provide
the economy with a new dynamism. Yet none of this
could be done without a new resource allocation
which would inevitably generate sharp conflicts with
the existing expatriate monopolies and within the
alliance of domestic classes which constituted the
nationalist coalition. If the expatriate power was
sustained, the transition to independence would have
had no effect and the new regime would soon become
as unpopular as the old one; if the African petit
bourgeoisie took over the existing monopolies it
would soon inherit the hostility of the peasantry and
working class and disrupt the nationalist alliance; if it
failed to establish viable economic structures
controlled by technically competent individuals (in
very short supply among the indigenous population)
production would break down and a serious
regression occur.
The solution to this problem was seen to be the
development of a socialist/populist strategy which,
even in its most 'right-wing' variants, incorporated a
central role for the state in relation to both overall
regulation (called 'planning') and direct intervention
in the production process itself. Since the state was
now, through the democratic process, seen to be
directly accountable to the indigenous population,
and since its apparatuses were to be rapidly
Africanised, it was widely assumed that it could be
relied upon to institute a rational and non-conflictual
development process which would restructure both a
backward economy and a racist social structure. The
'socialist' orientation of the new strategy entirely
eschewed any expropriation of indigenous property
rights, treating these as 'pre-capitalist' and therefore
no threat to egalitarianism. Instead it organised the
extension of state control over the sphere of
circulation (marketing, banking, services) and, in the
'left-wing' cases, over new areas of production,
notably in secondary industry. Thus, the image of the
post-colonial rural society was one in which the
productive powers of a relatively egalitarian com-
munity of petty producers were to be organised on a
non-exploitative basis by a rational and politically
responsible, bureaucratic apparatus. Our prime
theoretical concern must therefore be to explain the
evident failure of this strategy, both as a mechanism
for economic efficiency and for egalitarian distribution.
Bureaucratic Failure in the Post-Colonial
State
The choice of this strategy, a function of the balance of
class forces at the end of the colonial period, was based
upon a set of assumptions about the pre-capitalist
nature of the direct producers which constitute civil
society, the rationality of formal public bureaucratic
apparatuses, and about the nature of the interaction
between them with respect to the generation of output
and provision of services. The direct producers were
presented as having undifferentiated needs whose
fulfilment need not generate any significant contra-
diction between each other; the bureaucrats were
assumed to have no internal class interest, only an
interest in providing a service to others on the
principles of formal rationality spelled out by Weber
[1978] and Simon [19611; finally, bureaucrats and
direct producers were then expected to relate to each
other on an arms-length basis, allowing each to
perform their functions in accordance with the
principles of autonomy and universalism postulated in
Parsonian sociological theory [Parsons 1951].
Unfortunately it soon transpired that none of these
assumptions held, so the system very quickly
demonstrated that it could not function as it should.
By looking at the gap between these three ideal-typical
assumptions and African reality we can therefore
begin to produce some analytically rigorous
explanations for this failure.
(a) Bureaucracy and Peasantry
Firstly, the notion of an undifferentiated peasantry
capable of being equally served by a technocratic
bureaucracy guided by the rational economic
decisions of a national planning staff can be quickly
disposed of. Long before the end of colonialism
numerous inequalities had emerged within the African
rural communities themselves and between one
community and another. Differences in land-
holdings, technical competence and family size made
some farmers far more successful than others, while
differences in access to agricultural resources (land
fertility and essential infrastructure like roads and
schools) meant that some communities had prospered,
others had fallen far behind. In a situation in which
new resources were to remain scarce, these differences
were to be translated into an intensely political
struggle for what there was, a struggle which could not
be rationally resolved through the application of some
'planning' logic.
Instead, the allocation of resources to African
agriculture involved choices between strata and
regions which enriched some and impoverished
others, choices between backing a few 'progressive'
farmers and a larger number of 'ordinary' ones;
choices between building up the productive capacity
of already strong areas and attempting to develop new
ones whose needs were no doubt greater, but whose
productive potential was as yet relatively unproven. In
this situation planning decisions - presumably based
upon the need to maximise the return to the
investment of scarce resources took on an intensely
political significance; those of the agricultural
administration, notionally based on technical
rationality, equally so. Decisions about which inputs
to use clearly altered the relative life chances of
different categories of farmer - introduce exotic
cattle and you confine benefits to the minority able to
supervise them; upgrade local stock and you could
perhaps reach a whole community. Build a road into
one region, you put all its farmers into touch with the
market; build it into another and you leave them
isolated. And given that the whole society paid the
taxes out of which the services were provided, the
gains of the successful strata and regions were
inevitably made at the expense of those which were
overlooked.
When we look at the actual outcome of this process we
find massively unequal allocations and a corres-
ponding intensification of political conflict as a result.
Within regions, a strong bias towards western capital
intensive technology reinforced and extended the
power of large farmers as against small ones. Here the
desire of Western aid donors to sell their own
technology coincided with the desire of the large
farmers to upgrade their own activities. Hence the
bulk of the new investment went into mechanical
technology, complex farming systems, and exotic
livestock for a tiny minority, while the mass of the
poor peasantry were left to continue with what they
had had before. Regionally, the resource allocation
pattern depended upon the origins of the groups which
had captured political power at the centre; almost
always this left some areas unserviced and deepened
their underdevelopment.
Needless to say, both of these processes created
powerful political tensions. Since the mass of the
peasantry gained virtually nothing from the new
structure, their support for the nationalist alliance
soon collapsed, leading to the disintegration of most
of the political parties which had organised the
transition to self-rule. Given the inequality in regional
allocations, it is also hardly surprising that tribal
conflicts intensified and often violent separatist
movements were common. The existence of these
tensions both inside and between regions therefore
undermined links between periphery and centre and
destroyed the assumption that the state could be relied
on to serve the needs of the whole people. Having
begun as an agency captured from the colonialists on
behalf of the nation, it had come to be seen as a
mechanism for the extraction of surpluses from many
for allocation to an increasingly favoured few.
(b) Bureaucratic Rationality and Particularistic
Demands
Secondly, the role and structure of the civil service
itself in the development process, modelled upon that
of the social democratic interventionist state in
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Europe, could not be sustained in the ambiguous
context of society undergoing a transition from a
colonial and predominantly pre-capitalist structure.
The Weberian model of a service bureaucracy
presupposed a group of officials appointed by merit,
differentiated and stratified by function and skill,
capable of achieving least-cost solutions to problems
through the application of scientific knowledge.
Having been thus identified, the civil servant will then
be paid an adequate wage to compensate him/her for
the disabilities involved in having to accept the
organisational constraints involved in performing the
task. It is therefore assumed that a stratum of people
will exist in the society to fill these positions with the
necessary skills and motivated to perform the task in
this impersonal way. Most especially, these individuals
should not regard their control over administrative
resources as a means for personal, family or class
enrichment nor as a method of exerting social control
over civil society itself. The administration is to serve
as a means to political ends identified through the
political process, not as an instrument of political
control.
Now the most obvious difficulty at independence in
this regard was the absence of 'trained' personnel,
trained in the academic skills considered essential for
the decision-making levels of administrative structures
from which Africans had previously been excluded;
trained in the motivational understanding required to
develop the sense of vocation which would ensure a
proper willingness to put service above self. The
limited size of the pool of indigenous graduates was
widely publicised, as was the necessity to promote
under-trained personnel from middle-level into
higher-level positions. To deal with this problem an
immense effort was put into public administration
training, with a leading role being played by aid-
financed institutions which were designed to teach
Western (and largely American) public administration
theory to the new personnel [Schaffer 1974].
No doubt this problem was a serious one, but
probably not the most important source of subsequent
difficulties. By the end of the 1960s a number of
African countries - for example Ghana, Nigeria,
Uganda and Senegal - had produced a substantial
cadre of graduate administrators with the training and
skills which would have equipped them to perform
their technical functions perfectly adequately in most
Western bureaucracies. What was more problematic
about their situation was the nature of the
relationships between resources they earned and
controlled as civil servants and their class position in
the wider society.
Firstly, although recruited for the most part from the
most prosperous regions and strata within colonial
26
society, control over a senior civil service position
involved an immense jump in status, wealth and power
for the individuals concerned. The lack of a developed
indigenous capitalist class and the dominant economic
role accorded to the administration, meant that these
positions were seen to be uniquely desirable, and to
put their incumbents in control of an immensely
powerful set of resources - a very large regular
income, patronage in appointments, overseas travel
and contacts, the power to award contracts, allocate
developmental resources, and grant access to a wide
array of very scarce services. And although security of
tenure and pension rights at least notionally
guaranteed the incumbent long-term security, it could
not provide for all of the needs of a complex and
extensive family network which remained in the petty
commodity producing class. Hence the immense
resources were immediately subjected to an equally
immense set of demands on the part of relatives and
clients who could hardly be expected to be satisfied to
remain subordinate. Thus, confronted with a set of
demands for assistance far more urgent and extensive
than those experienced by their counterparts in the
West (where senior bureaucrats are for the most part
recruited from wealthy and high status strata), it was
inevitable that their decisions would come to be
powerfully influenced by personal and particular
considerations.
Secondly, the African civil servant was recruited from
a society of petty producers and retained his/her
control over productive assets there. Being placed in
direct control of the resources to be provided by the
state to direct producers, it was inevitable that these
should be used to extend their own private economic
power and that of their kinship network. Salaries
could be used to buy land, special access arranged to
state credit schemes, preferential use made of critical
resources like tractors, and so on. The political
leadership and senior civil servants (including army
officers) thus became deeply enmeshed in the struggle
for resources described above, a struggle essentially
intended to transform them into an indigenous
capitalist class. In effect we can see that control over
the resources appropriated through the economic
coercive power of the state was being used as a
mechanism of primitive accumulation, to become 'a
point of departure' [Marx 1976:873] for the creation of
capitalist production relations in a community
previously excluded from them by the racist
monopolies of colonialism.
In this process the universalistic civil service norms
were often treated with contempt. Again, of course,
these temptations do not present themselves in the
same way to their Western counterparts. In these
contexts the concentration of capital and existence of
developed employment opportunities for the whole of
the educated stratum means that primitive accumu-
lation of this kind is neither necessary nor possible. In
the African context, however, the pressure to 'misuse'
power for personal and family benefit was unremitting
since the rewards of success were so large, and the
costs of failure to individuals left struggling in the
petty producing class, so heavy.
(c) Bureaucratic Planning, Monopoly Rents and
Economic Inefficiency
Thus, we can see that neither the concept of
undifferentiated peasant community nor that of
disinterested servant of the state and people was an
adequate description of either the direct producers or
the bureaucrats paid to service them. This being so, it
also follows that the interaction between them will
have failed to conform to the rational planning model
on which it was supposedly based. Bureaucratic
delivery based upon state enforced monopoly powers
involves a rejection of market allocation where access
to inputs and outputs is rationed by prices reflecting
the relative scarcity of factors of production and
consumer goods. Access to both (and therefore
control over economic power) is therefore allocated
impersonally, and a function of technical competence
and control over the capital assets required to produce
in a given technological context. The market may
enable new producers to emerge and established
producers to disappear, but it will not generate
equality of rewards or of opportunity. On the
contrary, competition is designed to give everyone not
what they need but what they deserve, on the
assumption that real incentives and sanctions are
needed to guarantee maximum performance. The
rationality of the market system, and its legitimacy,
therefore rests upon the impersonality through which
its agents are rewarded for satisfying expressed needs,
and upon the existence of formal equality of access
and of insecurity Macpherson 1962]. Here prices
must reflect the real cost of factors and of labour
because anyone capable of using them more
economically will have been free to enter the market
and to make them available.
The insecurity and inequality generated by market
competition has produced the range of interventionist
theories from Keynesianism to statism designed to use
political authority to redistribute resources in a
manner which will offset these tendencies. All of these
involve two related elements - the acceptance of a
central political decision to offset a result which would
otherwise have occurred as a result of individual
interaction, and the creation and allocation of a
monopoly rent. The legitimacy and economic efficiency
of this decision will then depend upon the adequacy of
the process through which it is arrived at, and of the
productivity of any new investments which it might
finance. Where planning involves a centralised
decision, the aggregation of preferences can only be
accepted as legitimate where democratic procedures
exist to control the planners [Arrow 19631. Where
planners tax existing producers to finance new
activities, growth will only be greater where it can be
shown that the alternative activities will be more
productive than existing ones in the long run. Where,
on the other hand, the monopoly power of the state is
used to appropriate rent without consultation, and
then allocate it to non-productive or less-productive
activities than would be the case otherwise, we can
expect a collapse both of political authority and of
economic stability and growth. And there can be little
doubt that it has been the latter, rather than the former
model which has prevailed in most of tropical Africa
over the past 25 years.
In the colonial period it was the monopoly rents
extracted by the expatriate merchant and settler
classes which inhibited the further development ofthe
productive forces after the export economy had been
created. The transition to independence and the
creation of democratic structures suggested that the
planning process could be brought under social
control and turned into an engine for the sort of
growth stimulated by the social democratic experience
of Western Europe in the 20 years after the war. But it
is now clear that this model, and in particular the
bureaucratic structures derived from it, was entirely
inappropriate in the context we have described, where
monopolistic state power, exercised by a new
bureaucratic class, was expected to determine the
relative needs of an extensive class of atomised petty
producers, and to find some rational basis on which to
allocate resources to them.
In a situation in which procurement, land rights and
the allocation of inputs are in the hands of state
agencies, and where they also appropriate surpluses in
the form of taxes, marketing board profits (or
excessive costs) and foreign exchange allocations
(based on non-convertible currencies and over-valued
exchange rates), the problem of democratic super-
vision of the planning process becomes an immensely
difficult one. Highly technical calculations are
inevitably involved, and an immense array of hidden
mechanisms exist through which strategically located
interests can appropriate rents and destroy potential
competitors. And where the community of producers
is hardly literate, widely dispersed, out of touch with
public information, and divided internally by the
forces of competition, the possibility of ensuring that
their political representatives sustain an adequate
control over the allocation process is almost
non-existent.
Equally important, their political representatives,
and, as we have seen, the bureaucratic cadre itself,
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were themselves recruited from the upper stratum of
the peasant community and concerned to use their
political control to maximise their own economic
gains within the competitive struggle for economic
resources. In a pure market situation political power
would not serve this purpose, since accumulation
would depend directly upon the capacity to buy and to
sell. But the complex and extensive system of
expropriations, subsidies and direct allocations which
constituted the structure of state intervention in the
African context could have been expressly designed as
a mechanism for primitive accumulation by the
political and bureaucratic class. In some cases the
subventions were direct - as where large farmers were
provided with heavily subsidised land-clearing and
ploughing services. In others they were indirect and
depended upon the scarcity value of a community
being offered at a subsidised price. In these cases the
bureaucrat could exploit the situation by demanding a
bribe to guarantee delivery, and thus appropriate a
proportion of the monopoly rent. In both cases,
moreover, the possibility of appropriation through the
manipulation of state power was a function of the
existence of prices which did not reflect the real costs
of the assets involved; had they been set at the level
corresponding to market value the link between direct
political control and surplus extraction would have
been severed.
In this context, therefore, the political/bureaucratic
class developed a vested interest in sustaining the price
distortions which allowed them to control surpluses
and use them to strengthen their economic and/or
political power. Where it can be shown that these
distortions are generating an accumulation process
with positive results, the mere fact that market
rationality has been overturned need not cause us any
concern. But the African evidence as to the
irrationality of the great majority of bureaucratic
decisions is overwhelming. It is impossible here to
document this assertion, but the evidence is easy to
find in grossly over-extended civil service payrolls;
pricing policies which left the direct producers with
virtually nothing and caused them to stop cash-crop
production; investment in largely useless capital
intensive technology for a minority of inefficient large-
scale producers, while the mass of small producers get
virtually nothing; the building of expensive prestige
projects in towns while the rural infrastructure
collapses; the subsidisation of uneconomic industry to
the point where the cost of the inputs was higher than
the value of the corresponding imported finished
products.
In this process a limited fraction of the aspirant petit
bourgeosie made substantial gains and translated
them into immense wealth, but at the expense of the
political integrity and economic coherence of the
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system as a whole. At the same time, almost all of the
gains were secured at the expense of the small-scale
direct producers whose output earned the foreign
exchange and supplied the domestic market with
essential inputs, particularly of food. Being atomised
politically and disorganised economically, this class
has been unable to respond to this attack through the
creation of a political movement capable of
representing its interests and enforcing a change of
priorities at the centre. Instead, it reacted by reducing
production and, more especially and more interest-
ingly, by diverting it into the 'black economy'.
Having become a mechanism for surplus extraction
rather than service provision, the state now finds its
activities increasingly bypassed. Goods are smuggled
across borders; currencies change hands at unofficial
exchange rates; official marketing agencies are
ignored and goods exchanged by unlicensed traders at
fully negotiated prices. Having attempted to use state
controls to displace the free market, the former finds
itself increasingly marginalised by the re-emergence of
a market system over which it has lost almost all
control.
This process has developed to different degrees in
different countries, but its negative consequences can
be seen at work everywhere. Those which have been
damaged by it least are probably the ones which have
imposed fewest limits upon the private investment
activities of the accumulating class. Thus, the recent
debate on the emergence and potential of a 'national
bourgeoisie' in Kenya is a response to the evident
success of the dominant political class there in using its
appropriations to create at least some relatively
successful capitalist enterprises in agriculture and
industry [Swainson 1980; Leys 1978; Kaplinsky,
Henly, Leys 1980]. On the other hand, perhaps the
greatest structural problems have emerged in
countries like Tanzania, where the commitment to
state intervention involved, in addition, the forcible
repression of a wide range of private capitalist
interests. Here state failure has meant that production
has fallen significantly over the past decade [Coulson
1982].
In the longer term, this failure of state planning has
discredited the confident predictions of the 'left' at the
end of the 1960s when it asserted that it was to be the
state-controlled economies like Tanzania as opposed
to the capitalist dominated ones like Kenya, which
were going to be the most likely to succeed. It is now
being used in the now dominant economic literature
[e.g. Little 1982] and by the IMF and World Bank
[Guitian 1982; World Bank 1979] to reassert the
orthodox liberal case in favour of privatisation and
market rationality.
Conclusions: Back to and Beyond the Market
The analysis presented here has clearly been
powerfully influenced by these developments, and also
suggests that in many contexts the poor and middle
peasantry would be better off if a substantial part of
the state apparatus was dismantled and replaced by
private enterprise, provided that the entrepreneurs
concerned were subjected to market competition and
not provided with the monopoly powers given to their
expatriate predecessors in the colonial period. But it
would be wrong to treat this analysis as no more than a
case for a return to market forces, since it is by no
means clear that this would safeguard the rights and
productive capacity of the poor peasantry. In a
context in which there is already a substantial degree
of inequality, in which the dominant strata in the
countryside are capable of using their social and
economic power to enforce the support of the rest,
market forces, too, could act to reinforce inequalities
and hasten the disintegration of the property rights of
a large proportion of the poor. Although state
structures can be shown to have exploited the
peasantry ruthlessly and inefficiently, it does not
follow that the latter are likely to prefer the
exploitation of a capitalist merchant and financial
class very much more. Rural populism in many
countries has almost always been strongly anti-
capitalist because of the insecurity of the agricultural
production process and the perceived (whether rightly
or wrongly) exploitativeness of the traders and banks.
My own concern in this analysis has been to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the view of the
bureaucratic process in the social democratic theory
which served to validate the interventionist policies of
the l960s and early l970s, not in order to legitimate a
return to the market, but to demonstrate the need for
the creation of politically controlled structures for
economic intervention which would meet the real
needs of a community of small-scale producers of the
African type. Clearly the Weberian bureaucratic
model does not meet these needs. Instead we have to
ask how far and in what ways control over these
structures can be decentralised to the local level, and
political and economic accountability enforced. Here
it may well be that cooperative and/or voluntary
organisations supported by the state, organised on
democratic principles, and operating in a context in
which they had to compete on the market with
organisations of the same kind and the private sector
as well, would be far more appropriate than the statist
agencies which have dominated the scene up to now.
There is no space here to take up the many
complications which these alternatives suggest; there
can be no doubt at all, however, about the need for a
far more rigorous critique from the left of the inner
dynamic of the orthodox bureaucratic model in Africa
(and perhaps elsewhere) than we have had hitherto.
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